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Prospect theory is currently the main descriptive theory of decision under uncertainty. It generalizes expectedutility by introducing nonlinear decision weighting and loss aversion. A difficulty in the study of multiat-
tribute utility under prospect theory is to determine when an attribute yields a gain or a loss. One possibility,
adopted in the theoretical literature on multiattribute utility under prospect theory, is to assume that a decision
maker determines whether the complete outcome is a gain or a loss. In this holistic evaluation, decision weighting
and loss aversion are general and attribute-independent. Another possibility, more common in the empirical
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dations for this attribute-specific evaluation where decision weighting and loss aversion are depending on the
attributes.
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1. Introduction
Many decision situations involve outcomes that con-
sist of several attributes. In applied decision anal-
yses, it is useful to decompose the utility function
over these multiattribute outcomes into separate util-
ity functions over the different attributes to reduce the
number of preference elicitations. This is only justi-
fied if the decision-maker’s preferences satisfy partic-
ular assumptions. Several authors have identified the
preference conditions that allow decomposing mul-
tiattribute utility functions into additive, multiplica-
tive, and related decompositions (e.g., Farquhar 1975,
Fishburn 1965, Keeney and Raiffa 1976).
Most of these decomposition results have been
derived under expected utility. Abundant evidence
exists, however, that (subjective) expected utility is
not valid as a descriptive theory of decision under
(uncertainty) risk. The descriptive deficiencies of
expected utility complicate the empirical assessment
of the preference conditions underlying decompo-
sitions: it cannot be excluded that observed viola-
tions of preference conditions are due to violations of
expected utility rather than to violations of a decom-
position. To obtain robust tests of the appropriateness
of decompositions, it is desirable to derive conditions
that are valid even when expected utility is violated.
In this paper, we study multiattribute utility theory
under prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979,
Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Prospect theory is cur-
rently the most influential theory of decision mak-
ing under uncertainty. It models two major deviations
from expected utility: nonlinear decision weighting
and loss aversion, i.e., the tendency that people treat
outcomes as deviations from a reference point and
are more sensitive to losses than to gains of the same
magnitude. Both nonlinear decision weighting and
loss aversion are widely documented in the empirical
literature. Despite its popularity, some evidence has
been accumulated recently revealing limitations of the
theory (see the summaries of Marley and Luce 2005
and Birnbaum 2008).
Fishburn (1984), Miyamoto (1988), Dyckerhoff
(1994), and Miyamoto and Wakker (1996) also stud-
ied multiattribute utility under nonexpected utility,
but only considered outcomes of the same sign. Like
us, Zank (2001) and Bleichrodt and Miyamoto (2003)
studied multiattribute utility theory under prospect
theory but their approach was different than the
approach of this paper, as we explain next.
A central issue in multiattribute prospect theory
is to determine when an attribute yields a gain or
a loss. Consider, for example, a research associate
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(RA) who contemplates changing jobs. In evaluat-
ing different jobs, the RA has to consider several
aspects, e.g., salary, commuting time, cost of liv-
ing, amount of research time, etc. How does the
RA determine whether a particular job offer is an
improvement (a gain) compared with her reference
point (presumably her current job)? One possibility is
that she first determines whether the job offer, as a
whole, is a gain or a loss compared to her reference
point, and then applies the decomposition to deter-
mine how attractive the job offer is compared with
other offers. This holistic evaluation was used by Zank
(2001) and by Bleichrodt and Miyamoto (2003).
Another approach, the focus of this paper, is that
the RA determines a reference point for each attribute
and evaluates job offers as gains and losses on each
attribute. This attribute-specific evaluation seems plau-
sible when the number of attributes is large and
the choice is complex. A decision context where the
attribute-specific evaluation is particularly intuitive is
welfare theory: there we are interested in whether
each individual’s welfare is above some reference
level. The attribute-specific evaluation is commonly
assumed in empirical studies on loss aversion for
trade-offs under certainty and was found to be
descriptively accurate by some studies (Bateman
et al. 1997, Bleichrodt and Pinto 2002, Tversky and
Kahneman 1991). Also empirical studies for decision
under risk relied on the attribute-specific evaluation.
See, for example, Payne et al. (1984) who study man-
agers’ choices among capital budget proposals involv-
ing cash flows at two points in time, and Fischer
et al. (1986) who consider both risky, multiperiod
cash flows and risky job alternatives. Both studies
use attribute-specific reference points. No preference
foundation of the attribute-specific evaluation existed
until now. Providing such a foundation is the topic of
this paper.
The difference between the holistic and the at-
tribute-specific evaluation is that in the former, loss
aversion and decision weighting are attribute-inde-
pendent, whereas in the latter they depend on the
attributes. As we show in §5, the holistic and the
attribute-specific evaluation are in general equivalent
only when people behave according to expected util-
ity, i.e., when loss aversion does not affect people’s
preferences and there is no decision weighting. An
example to further clarify the difference between the
holistic and the attribute-specific evaluation is in §3.
This paper gives preference foundations for addi-
tive utility under prospect theory and the attribute-
specific evaluation. We restrict our attention to the
additive decomposition for two reasons: First, it is
commonly applied in many areas of economics and
decision analysis. Second, other decompositions, such
as multiplicative and multilinear utility, raise spe-
cial problems under the attribute-specific evaluation.
Solving these problems is beyond the scope of this
paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 gives notation and explains prospect the-
ory for single-attribute outcomes. In §3, we move to
multiattribute utility where we first assume, for ease
of exposition, that there are just two attributes, both
numerical. Section 4 gives preference foundations
for prospect theory with additive utility under the
attribute-specific evaluation. As mentioned, weight-
ing functions are defined per attribute and they may
differ across attributes in the attribute-specific eval-
uation. To force them to be equal across attributes
requires additional conditions. We will characterize
this special case in §5. We extend our results to the
case where there are more than two attributes in §6
and to the case of nonnumeric outcomes in §7. Sec-
tion 8 concludes the paper with some observations
on the empirical measurement of additive utility in
prospect theory under the attribute-specific evalua-
tion. All proofs are in the appendix.
2. Prospect Theory for
Single-Attribute Outcomes
We consider a decision maker in a situation where
there is a finite number, n ≥ 2 of distinct states of
nature, exactly one of which obtains. S = 1    n
denotes the finite set of states of nature. Subsets of S are
called events. In a medical decision problem, the states
of nature can, for example, be mutually exclusive dis-
eases, and the decision maker has to choose between
different treatments before knowing what the actual
disease is. We consider decision under uncertainty
where the probabilities for the states of nature may,
but need not, be given. The assumption of a finite
number of states of nature is made for expositional
purposes. The results of this paper can be extended
to an infinite state space using tools from Wakker
(1993). The extension to decision under risk, i.e., the
case where probabilities are objectively given, is as in
Köbberling and Wakker (2003, §5.3).
The decision-maker’s problem is to choose between
prospects. Each prospect is an n-tuple of outcomes, one
for each state of nature. Formally, a prospect is a func-
tion from the set of states of nature to the set of out-
comes C. We denote the set of prospects as P =Cn.
We shall write f1     fn for the prospect f that
gives fj if state j occurs. A constant prospect gives
the same outcome for each state of nature. For ease
of exposition, we assume in this section that out-
comes are one-dimensional. The set of outcomes C is
a nondegenerate convex subset of . Outcomes are
defined with respect to a reference point. The reference
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point is a constant prospect, that we will denote as r .
We assume that the reference point is fixed, i.e., we
restrict attention to preferences with respect to one
reference point. Variations in the reference point are
analyzed by Schmidt (2003).
Let  denote a preference relation on the set of
prospects. As usual,  denotes the asymmetric part
of  (strict preference) and ∼ denotes the symmetric
part of  (indifference), and  and ≺ denote reversed
preferences. We shall use the same notation for the
binary relations on C, derived through constant pros-
pects. An outcome x  r is a gain and an outcome
x≺ r is a loss.
A prospect f is rank-ordered if f1  · · ·  fn. For
each prospect, there exists a permutation , such that
f1  · · ·  fn. For each permutation , let P =
f ∈ P	 f1  · · ·  fn. That is, P is the set of all
prospects that are rank-ordered by . If two prospects
can be rank-ordered by a common , then they are
comonotonic. For each event A⊂ S, the set PA contains
those prospects that yield gains for states in A, and no
gains for states not in A. We define the set PA as the
intersection of PA and P. Subsets of sets PA are sign-
comonotonic.
A real-valued function V 	 P →  represents  on
P if for all f , g ∈ P we have f  g if and only if
(iff) V f  ≥ V g. A function V is a ratio scale if it
is unique up to unit, i.e., if V can be replaced by
U if and only if U = 
V for positive 
 . A weighting
function or capacity W is a function on 2S , such that
W
= 0, WS= 1, and for any two events A and B,
if B ⊂A then WB≤WA. W is strictly increasing if
WB <WA whenever B is a proper subset of A.
Prospect theory holds if there exists a utility function
U	 C →  with Ur = 0 such that prospects f ∈ PA
with A = 1     k for some k ≤ n are evalu-
ated by
PTf =
k∑
j=1
+jU fj+
n∑
j=k+1
−jU fj (1)
with
+j = W+1j−W+1j−1 (2a)
and
−j=W−jn−W−j+1n (2b)
and choices and preferences correspond with this eval-
uation. PTf  denotes the prospect theory value, or PT
value for short, of f , and W+ and W− are weighting
functions for gains and losses, respectively. We will
assume throughout that U is strictly increasing, i.e., for
all xy ∈ C, Ux ≥ Uy iff x ≥ y, and continuous. If
prospect theory holds, then utility is a ratio scale and
the weighting functions are uniquely determined.
3. Prospect Theory for Two-Attribute
Outcomes
From now on C = C1 × C2 is a product of two
nondegenerate convex subsets of . Hence we now
deal with two product structures: the two-dimensional
structure of C and the n-dimensional structure Cn.
In what follows, the index i will refer to the attributes,
and the index j to the states of nature. Hence fji
denotes the ith attribute of the outcome that is
obtained under state j Outcomes in C will be denoted
as x= x1x2 or as x1x2 for short. Note that although
we assumed x1 and x2 to be numerical, the notation
x1x2 should not be interpreted as multiplication.
Let P1 denote the set of prospects on Cn1 and P2 the
set of prospects on Cn2  For a fixed f2 ∈ P2, we define a
preference relation 1 on P1 by f1 1 g1 iff f1f2  g1f2.
In §4 we impose a condition that implies that the
choice of f2 is immaterial. By restricting attention to
constant prospects in P1, we can define a preference
relation 1 on C1 In a similar fashion we can define
2 on P2 and on C2.
A function U	 C →  is additive if U	 x → U1x1+
U2x2 where Ui is a real-valued function on Ci,
i= 12. The functions U1 and U2 are joint ratio scales if
U1 and U2 can be replaced by V1 and V2 if and only if
Vi = 
Ui, 
 > 0 That is, any common change in unit
is allowed.
In the holistic evaluation, any outcome x that is
indifferent to r can also be interpreted as a reference
point. Hence, it does not make sense to consider gains
or losses on any separate dimension in the holistic
evaluation. What matters in the holistic evaluation is
whether an outcome x is a gain or a loss compared
to r (i.e., whether x r or x≺ r , respectively).
Under the holistic evaluation, additive decompos-
ability means that a prospect f ∈ PA with A =
1     k for some k≤ n is evaluated as
PTf  =
k∑
j=1
+jU1fj1+U2fj2
+
n∑
j=k+1
−jU1fj1+U2fj2 (3)
where the decision weights are defined as in Equa-
tions (2a) and (2b). The uniqueness results of prospect
theory apply, which implies that the attribute util-
ity functions are joint ratio scales and the weight-
ing function is unique. There is only one permutation
function that applies to both attributes. In this rep-
resentation, the decision weight that is assigned to a
single-attribute utility function Ui, i= 12 depends
on whether the entire outcome is a gain or a loss. If
an outcome x is a gain then the decision weight +
is applied, if it is a loss then − is applied. Prefer-
ence foundations for Equation (3) were given by Zank
(2001) and Bleichrodt and Miyamoto (2003).
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The attribute-specific evaluation assesses for each
attribute separately whether it yields a gain or a loss
and the magnitude of each. That is, the attribute-
specific evaluation interprets reference-dependence
for each attribute separately. We will denote the
reference point on the first attribute by r1 and the refer-
ence point on the second attribute by r2. x1 ∈C1 is a gain
if x1 1 r1, and a loss if x1 ≺1 r1, and x2 ∈ C2 is a gain
if x2 2 r2, and a loss if x2 ≺2 r2. We assume that pref-
erences are monotonic in each attribute. Then, unlike
in the holistic evaluation, the reference point will be
unique. We further assume that r1 is an interior point
of C1 and that r2 is an interior point of C2. This ensures
that C1 and C2 both contain outcomes that are gains
and outcomes that are losses, and that genuine trade-
offs between gains and losses exist for both attributes.
For each prospect f , there exist permutations 1
and 2 such that f111  · · · f1n1 and f212  · · ·
f2n2. Let P1 = f ∈ P	 f111  · · ·  f1n1. That is,
P1 is the set of all prospects where outcomes are
rank-ordered by 1. P2 is defined similarly. For each
event A1 ⊂ S, the set PA1 contains those prospects
that yield gains on the first attribute for states in A1
and no gains on the first attribute for states not
in A1. Similarly, PA2 contains those prospects that
yield gains on the second attribute for states in A2
and no gains on the second attribute for states not
in A2. We define PA11 = PA1 ∩ P1 and PA22 = PA2 ∩
P2 . Subsets of P
A1
1
are said to be sign-comonotonic on
C1 and subsets of PA22 are said to be sign-comonotonic
on C2. Under the attribute-specific evaluation, a prospect
f ∈ PA11 ∩ PA22 with A1 = 11     1k1 and A2 =
21     2k2 for some k1 k2 ≤ n is evaluated as
PTf =
k1∑
j=1
+1j1U1f1j1+
n∑
j=k1+1
−1j1U1f1j1
+
k2∑
j=1
+2j2U2f2j2+
n∑
j=k2+1
−2j2U2f2j2 (4)
with
+iji = W+i i1     ij
−W+i i1     ij − 1 i= 12 (5a)
and
−iji = W−i ij     in
−W−i ij + 1     in i= 12 (5b)
and preferences and choices correspond with this
evaluation. The functions U1 and U2 are strictly
increasing and continuous and satisfy U1r1 =
U2r2 = 0. The decision weights +1·1 and −1·1 are
the decision weights for gains and losses for the first
attribute, +2·2 and 
−
2·2 are the decision weights for
gains and losses for the second attribute, W+1 and W
−
1
are the weighting functions for gains and losses for
the first attribute, and W+2 and W
−
2 are the weighting
functions for gains and losses for the second attribute.
The utility functions are joint ratio scales and the
attribute weighting functions are unique. A compar-
ison between Equations (3) and (4) reveals that the
holistic evaluation and the attribute-specific evalu-
ation differ both in loss aversion and in decision
weighting.
An example may further clarify the difference
between the holistic and the attribute-specific eval-
uation of additive utility. Suppose that the RA con-
siders a job offer from a university in a different
town. The uncertainty she faces is whether her hus-
band will be able to find a suitable job in the new
town. If he does, their combined annual income will
be $80K but she will only have 15 hours research
time per week because she will have to take over
some domestic activities from her husband (e.g., tak-
ing care of the children). If he does not find a job,
their combined annual income will be $40K but she
will have 30 hours research time per week because
her husband will take care of all domestic activities.
In the example, there is only one source of uncertainty
(whether or not the RA’s husband finds a suitable
job). In real-life applications, there may be different
sources of uncertainty affecting the attributes sepa-
rately. For example, the RA’s research time may not
be affected by her husband finding a job (because
she can hire someone to take care of her domestic
activities) but it is affected by whether or not she
will be able to find a suitable home near the univer-
sity (if not, commuting will negatively affect the time
available for research). To model such situations we
have to refine the state space (events are “husband
finds job and home near the university,” “husband
finds job but home far from university,” etc.). For sim-
plicity of exposition, we only consider one source of
uncertainty.
The RA’s preferences are monotonic both in money
(more money is preferred) and in research time (more
research time is preferred). Suppose that currently the
RA and her husband earn $50K per year and she has
20 hours research time per week. Suppose also that
$80K15h  $50K 20h  $40K30h The RA’s
reference point is $50K20h in the holistic evalu-
ation. In the attribute-specific evaluation, the RA’s
reference point for annual income is $50K and for
research time it is 20 hours per week.
In the holistic evaluation, where we determine first
the sign of an outcome and then apply the decom-
positions, we assume that the RA’s utility function
for gains is ux1x2 − ur1r2 and her utility func-
tion for losses is ux1x2 − ur1r2, where  is a
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coefficient reflecting loss aversion and u is a basic
utility function, expressing the RA’s attitude toward
outcomes, which is reference independent (Tversky
and Kahneman 1991, Köbberling and Wakker 2005).
We assume that the holistic basic utility is additive
such that ux1x2= u1x1+u2x2.
In the attribute-specific evaluation, where first the
decomposition is applied and then it is determined
whether attributes yield gains or losses, the utility for
gains is uixi − uiri and for losses it is iuixi −
uiri; i= 12, where the i are attribute-specific loss
aversion coefficients.
The RA does not care about job aspects other than
wage rate and available research time. If event 1 is,
“her husband finds a job” and event 2 is, “her hus-
band does not find a job,” then, according to the holis-
tic evaluation (Equation (3)), the PT value of the new
job is equal to
+1
(
u180+u215− u150+u220
)
+−2 
(
u140+u230− u150+u220
)
 (6)
and according to the attribute-specific evaluation
(Equation (4)), it is equal to
+11
(
u180−u150
)+−122
(
u−2 15−u220
)
+−211
(
u140−u150
)++22
(
u230−u220
)
 (7)
A comparison between Equations (6) and (7) shows
that both decision weighting and loss aversion differ
between the two evaluations. Loss aversion and deci-
sionweighting are common for all individual attributes
in the holistic evaluation; the attribute-specific evalua-
tion, in general, allows for different degrees of loss aver-
sion and different weighting functions for each of the
individual attributes.
The possibility of attribute-dependent weighting
functions can be realistic in applications. Rottenstreich
and Hsee (2001) showed that decision weighting de-
pends on the outcome domain with people deviating
more from expected utility for affect-rich outcomes,
outcomes that arouse strong emotions. Examples of
such outcomes are health states and environmental
effects. For example, Smith and Keeney (2005) stud-
ied trade-offs between consumption and health. In
such a setting it might well be that people weight
health risks differently than consumption risks. Dyer
et al. (1998) compared different alternatives for dis-
posing surplus weapons-grade plutonium. Here deci-
sion makers may weight risks to the environment
differently from risk regarding the costs of the alter-
natives. In §5, we characterize the special case of
the attribute-specific evaluation where the weight-
ing functions are the same across different attributes.
There is no empirical evidence to conclude that loss
aversion differs across different attributes, but intu-
itively this seems to make sense.
4. Preference Foundations
This section develops preference foundations for ad-
ditive prospect theory under the attribute-specific
evaluation, i.e., Equation (4). We continue to assume
that C =C1×C2 with C1 and C2 nondegenerate convex
subsets of .
4.1. General Preference Conditions
This subsection presents the standard preference con-
ditions that are used in both the holistic and attribute-
specific approaches. The preference relation  on the
set of prospects P is a weak order if it is complete (for
all prospects f g f  g or g  f ) and transitive.
Any prospect f ∈ P yields both a prospect f1 ∈ P1
and a prospect f2 ∈ P2 and, hence, each prospect f
may be viewed as an element of the product P1 × P2.
Hence, we can denote prospects as f1f2. Weak
separability holds when for all f1g1 ∈ P1 and for all
f2g2 ∈ P2 f1f2  g1f2 iff f1g2  g1g2 and when for
all f1g1 ∈ P1 and for all f2g2 ∈ P2 f1f2  f1g2 iff
g1f2  g1g2. Weak separability entails that the relations
1 on P1 and 2 on P2 are well-defined.
Further standard properties are monotonicity for
outcomes and continuity: outcome monotonicity holds if
for i= 12 fji ≥ gji for all j implies fi i gi with strict
preference holding if one of the antecedent inequal-
ities is strict; continuity holds if for all prospects fi,
the sets gi ∈ Pi	 gi i fi and gi ∈ Pi	 gi i fi are both
closed in Cni , i= 12
4.2. Trade-off Consistency
To define trade-off consistency we introduce some
notation. For x ∈Ci, fi ∈ Pi, i= 12 and j ∈ S define
xjfi =
(
f1i     fj−1i x fj+1i     fni
)

that is, xjfi is the prospect fi with fji replaced by x.
Let a b cd ∈C1. We write
ab∼∗1 cd
if (i) there exist f1g1 ∈ P1, and f2 ∈ P2 and a state j
such that
ajf1 f2∼ bjg1 f2 and cjf1 f2∼ djg1 f2
where ajf1, bjg1, cjf1, and djg1 are sign-comono-
tonic on C1, or (ii) there exist v w ∈ C2, and f1 ∈ P1
such that
a1f1v1f2∼ b1f1w1f2 and
c1f1v1f2∼ d1f1w1f2
where a1f1, b1f1, c1f1, and d1f1 are rank-ordered
prospects in P1 and v1f2, and w1f2 are rank-ordered
prospects in P2.
In the first two indifferences, the prospect on
the second attribute is kept fixed, in the final two
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indifferences, everything outside state of nature 1 is
kept fixed. The ∼∗1 relationship may be interpreted
as measuring strength of preference. For example,
if a > b, from the indifferences ajf1 f2 ∼ bjg1 f2
and cjf1 f2 ∼ djg1 f2, we can see that ab ∼∗1 cd
means that, in the presence of f2, a trade-off of a for
b is an equally good improvement as a trade-off of
c for d: both exactly offset receiving f1 instead of g1
for all other states of nature. A similar interpretation
can be assigned to the indifferences a1f1v1f2 ∼
b1f1w1f2 and c1f1v1f2 ∼ d1f1w1f2. The
∼∗1 relations are defined entirely in terms of observed
indifferences and no new primitives beyond observed
choice are assumed in their definition. Hence, we
stay entirely within the revealed preference paradigm
when using the ∼∗1 relations.
Let wxyz ∈C2 We define
wx∼∗2 yz
if (i) there exist f2g2 ∈ P2, and f1 ∈ P1 and a state j
such that
f1wjf2∼ f1xjg2 and f1yjf2∼ f1 zjg2
where wjf2, xjg2, yjf2, and zjg2 are sign-comono-
tonic on C2 or (ii) there exist a b ∈ C1, and f2 ∈ P2
such that
a1f1w1f2∼ b1f1x1f2 and
a1f1y1f2∼ b1f1 z1f2
where w1f2, x1f2, y1f2, and z1f2 are rank-ordered
prospects in P2 and a1f1, and b1f1 are rank-ordered
prospects in P1.
We say that  satisfies trade-off consistency on C1
if improving the first attribute of an outcome in any
∼∗1 relationship breaks that relationship. That is, if
ab ∼∗1 cd and a′ 1 a then it cannot be that a′b ∼∗1 cd.
Loosely speaking, trade-off consistency on C1 ensures
that the ∼∗1 relationship is well-behaved when inter-
preted as a strength of preference relationship. If the
strength of preference of a over b is equal to the
strength of preference of c over d, then the strength of
preference of a′ over b cannot be equal to the strength
of preference of c over d, when a′ is strictly better
than a.
Similarly,  satisfies trade-off consistency on C2 if
improving the second attribute of an outcome in
any ∼∗2 relationship breaks that relationship. That is,
if wx ∼∗2 yz and y′ 2 y then it cannot be that
wx ∼∗2 y′z. Trade-off consistency holds if trade-off con-
sistency holds both on C1 and on C2. An important
advantage of trade-off consistency as a preference
condition is that it is closely related to measure-
ments of utility by the trade-off method (Wakker and
Deneffe 1996). This makes it easy to test trade-off
consistency empirically. Empirical studies that have
used the trade-off method include Abdellaoui (2000),
Etchart-Vincent (2004), Schunk and Betsch (2006), and
Abdellaoui et al. (2007) amongst others.
Trade-off consistency is a powerful condition. It has
two effects. First, it ensures that we can define
prospect theory functionals for both attributes and
second, it ensures that the overall evaluation is addi-
tive in these two prospect theory functionals.
4.3. Representation for Two Attributes
To derive the representing functional for preferences,
we need an additional assumption. Solvability holds if
for any two prospects f g ∈ P there exists outcomes
 and  such that (1f1 f2 ∼ g and f11f2 ∼ g.
Solvability implies that the attribute utility functions
U1 and U2 are unbounded.
The next theorem characterizes Equation (4).
Theorem 1. The following two statements are equiva-
lent:
(i)  is represented by the functional in Equation (4)
with strictly increasing weighting functionsW+1 ,W
−
1 ,W
+
2 ,
and W−2 and continuous, strictly increasing utility func-
tions U1 and U2.
(ii)  satisfies (1) weak ordering, (2) continuity,
(3) weak separability, (4) outcome monotonicity, (5) solv-
ability, and (6) trade-off consistency.
The uniqueness results of prospect theory apply, that is,
the weighting functions W+i and W
−
i , i = 12, are
uniquely determined, and the utility functions U1 and U2
are joint ratio scales.
5. Common Weighting Functions
In the attribute-specific evaluation, the weighting
functions may differ across the two attributes. In some
cases, however, it might be reasonable to take the
weighting functions independent of the attributes.
Empirical evidence suggests, for example, that deci-
sion weights for money and for health are close
(Abdellaoui 2000 compared with Bleichrodt and Pinto
2000). Using common weighting functions facilitates
the use of prospect theory in practical applications,
because fewer elicitations are required. In this section
we will give a preference foundation for the special
case of Equation (4) where the weighting functions do
not depend on the attributes.
By continuity and connectedness of C1 and C2, there
exist gains x1 ∈ C1 and x2 ∈ C2 and losses y1 ∈ C1
and y2 ∈ C2, such that x1 r2 ∼ r1x2 and y1 r2 ∼
r1y2 and, hence, such that U1x1 = U2x2 and
U1y1= U2y2. Recall that r is the constant prospect
that gives r1 r2 in every state of nature. For any
event B, let xBf denote the prospect f with fj replaced
by x for all j in B. We can now define a condition
that ensures attribute independence of the weighting
functions for gains and for losses.
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We say that  satisfies attribute-independence for
states, if for all x1 ∈C1 and x2 ∈C2 for which x1 r2∼
r1x2 and for all events B, x1 r2Br ∼ r1x2Br . Note
that the condition holds for all x1 ∈ C1 and x2 ∈ C2,
but x1 and x2 must be either both gains or both losses
for otherwise the indifference x1 r2∼ r1x2 cannot
obtain.
We will now explain the idea behind the condition.
As mentioned before, if x1 r2∼ r1x2 then U1x1=
U2x2. If Equation (4) holds and x1 and x2 are both
gains, the indifference x1 r2Br ∼ r1x2Br implies
that W+1 BU1x1=W+2 BU2x2 and W+1 B=W+2 B
follows from U1x1 = U2x2. A similar line of argu-
ment shows that W−1 B=W−2 B whenever x1 and x2
are losses. Because these equalities hold for all
events B, we obtain the following result:
Corollary 2. If we add attribute-independence for
states to statement (ii) of Theorem 1, then the weight-
ing functions in statement (i) of Theorem 1 are attribute-
independent, i.e., W+1 =W+2 =W+ and W−1 =W−2 =W−.
If 1 = 2 and A1 =A2 then Corollary 2 also implies
that the decision weights + and − are attribute-
independent. This follows from the definition of the
decision weights, Equations (5a) and (5b). Having
the weighting functions independent of the attributes
does not make the attribute-specific evaluation equal
to the holistic evaluation. This is easily seen by refer-
ring back to the example of the RA considering the
new job. Under the attribute-specific evaluation with
common weighting functions, Equation (7) becomes
+1 u180−u150+−1 2u215−u220
+−2 1u140−u150++2 u230−u215
showing that the attribute-specific evaluation clearly
differs from the holistic evaluation, Equation (6).
Note that it is not only the presence of the loss aver-
sion parameter that distinguishes the holistic from the
attribute-specific evaluation. In general, the two eval-
uations differ even if a prospect yields only gains or
only losses. Consider again the job offer example but
suppose now that the RA’s reference point for annual
earnings is $30K and for research time it is 10 hours
per week. The preference $80K15h  $40K30h
still holds. Let E1 denote the event “husband finds a
job” and E2 the event “husband does not find a job.”
Under the holistic evaluation, the job’s value is
W+E1
(
u180+u215−u130+u210
)
+(1−W+E1
)(
u140+u230−u130+u210
)

and under the attribute-specific evaluation it is
W+E1
(
u180−u130
)+(1−W+E2
)(
u215−u210
)
+(1−W+E1
)(
u140−u130
)
+W+(E2u230−u210
)

Equality only holds if W+E1 = 1 − W+E2, i.e.,
if W+E1 + W+E2 = 1. This must hold for all
events E1 and E2, and for the attribute-specific eval-
uation this can only be the case if W+ is a proba-
bility measure. A similar argument can be used to
derive that W− must be a probability measure. Hence,
for outcomes of the same sign and attribute inde-
pendent weighting, the attribute-specific evaluation
agrees with the holistic evaluation only when both
representations reduce to subjective expected utility.
6. More Than Two Attributes
We will now extend our results to more than two
attributes. Let C = C1 × · · · × Cm, m > 2. Each Ci is a
nondegenerate convex subset of . The reference point
on the ith attribute is denoted ri and is assumed to
be an interior point of Ci. We will denote the set of
prospects on Cni as Pi and write prospects as f1     fm.
Let gif denote the prospect f ∈ P with fi replaced by
gi, and let gihkf denote the prospect f ∈ P with fi
replaced by gi and fk replaced by hk. Weak separability
is now defined as follows: for all i ∈ 1    m, fi gi ∈
Pi, f ′g′ ∈ P , fif ′  gif ′ iff fig′  gig′. The definitions of
outcome monotonicity, continuity, and solvability eas-
ily generalize to the case of more than two attributes.
For trade-off consistency we define
ab∼∗i cd
if (i) there exist fi gi ∈ Pi, f ∈ P , and a state j such that
ajfiif ∼ bjgiif and cjfiif ∼ djgiif 
where ajfi, bjgi, cjfi, and djgi are sign-comono-
tonic on Ci, or (ii) there exist vw ∈ Ck, and f ∈ P
such that
a1fiiv1fkkf ∼ b1fiiw1fkkf and
c1fiiv1fkkf ∼ d1fiiw1fkkf 
where a1fi, b1fi, c1fi, and d1fi are rank-ordered
prospects in Pi and v1fk, and w1fk are rank-ordered
prospects in Pk.
Trade-off consistency holds if each ∼∗i -relationship
satisfies trade-off consistency on Ci.
We are now in a position to extend Theorem 1 to
the case of more than two attributes.
Theorem 3. The following two statements are equiva-
lent:
(i)  is represented by V = ∑mi=1Vifi where the Vi
are prospect theory functionals with strictly increasing
weighting functions W+i and W
−
i and continuous, strictly
increasing utility functions Ui.
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(ii)  satisfies (1) weak ordering, (2) continuity,
(3) weak separability, (4) outcome monotonicity, (5) solv-
ability, and (6) trade-off consistency.
The uniqueness results of prospect theory apply, that is,
the weighting functions W+i and W
−
i are uniquely deter-
mined, and the utility functions Ui are joint ratio scales.
Attribute independence can easily be extended to
the case of more than two attributes, so that the
arguments preceding Corollary 2 can still be used
to ensure that the weighting functions are attribute-
independent.
7. General Outcomes
For ease of exposition, we have assumed thus far
that all attributes are numerical. In many real-world
decisions, this assumption is too restrictive. An exam-
ple is health, the area in which decision analysis is
most frequently applied (Keller and Kleinmuntz 1998,
Smith and von Winterfeldt 2004). Health consists of
two dimensions, survival duration and health qual-
ity, and health quality is a nonnumeric attribute. The
extension of our analysis to nonnumeric attributes is
as follows.
Assume that the Ci are connected topological
spaces. C =C1×· · ·×Cm is endowed with the product
topology and so is Cn. The reference points ri are in
the interior of Ci for each i. Redefine outcome mono-
tonicity as follows: for all i, if fji  gji for all j then
fi i gi. The strict version of outcome monotonicity is
not necessary here as it follows from the version with
weak preferences and trade-off consistency (Köbber-
ling and Wakker 2003, Lemma 26). We can now state
the extension of our results to nonnumeric attributes.
Corollary 4. If the Ci, i = 1    m, are connected
topological spaces, then Theorems 1 and 3 still hold if we
drop in (i), the requirement that the attribute-wise utility
functions are strictly increasing.
The proof of this claim follows easily from the
proofs of Theorems 1 and 3. Corollary 2 can still
be used to ensure that the weighting functions are
attribute-independent.
8. Empirical Measurement
A few comments concerning the empirical imple-
mentability of additive prospect theory under the
attribute-specific evaluation are worth mentioning.
For empirical purposes a first step is obviously the
verification of the preference conditions that have
been identified in this paper. When these are sat-
isfied, the elicitation of the attribute-specific evalu-
ation is simpler than that of the holistic evaluation
because we do not need to know the ranking of out-
comes. Essentially, we can apply the known elicitation
techniques for single-dimensional prospect theory to
each of the attributes. When attribute-independence
for states holds, the weighting functions have to be
assessed only once.
A procedure to measure utility under prospect
theory was recently proposed by Abdellaoui et al.
(2007). Their method uses various elicitation tech-
niques (probability equivalence, certainty equivalence,
and Wakker and Deneffe’s 1996 trade-off method).
A simpler procedure was proposed by Abdellaoui
et al. (2008). Their method only uses certainty equiva-
lence questions but is less general than the procedure
of Abdellaoui et al. (2007) in that it assumes that the
utility functions are power functions.
The weighting functions W+i and W
−
i , i ∈ 1    m
can be measured either through the nonchoice-based
methods of Tversky and Fox (1995), Fox and Tversky
(1998), Wu and Gonzalez (1999), or Kilka and
Weber (2001) or through the choice-based method of
Abdellaoui et al. (2005). If probabilities are known
then the methods of Abdellaoui (2000) or Bleichrodt
and Pinto (2000) can be applied.
We can also use the representation results for
single-dimensional prospect theory (Prelec 1998,
Wakker and Tversky 1993, Wakker and Zank 2002)
to restrict the functional forms of the utility func-
tions and the weighting functions. If preferences
do not change when we multiply all levels of an
attribute by a common constant (while holding the
other attribute constant), then the attribute utility
function must be a power function. If preferences
are invariant to adding a constant to all levels of
an attribute such that the sign of the attribute lev-
els is preserved (and the other attribute is held
constant), then the attribute utility function is expo-
nential. When probabilities are known and prefer-
ences satisfy Prelec’s (1998) compound invariance
conditions, then the weighting functions must have
the form wip = exp−i ln−p, i=+−. Condi-
tions for deriving exponential or power weighting
functions are presented in Diecidue et al. (2009).
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Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. That (i) implies (ii) is routine.
Hence we assume (ii) and derive (i).
By weak order, weak separability, outcome monotonicity,
and continuity,  on P can be represented by V V1f1
V2f2 with V strictly increasing in V1 and V2. V1 represents
1 and V2 represents 2. By continuity, V1 and V2 are contin-
uous, by outcome monotonicity, they are strictly increasing.
We will now show that V1 and V2 are prospect theory
functionals. For a prospect f1 ∈ P1, define the prospect f +1
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by f +1j = f1j if f1j 1 r1 and by f +1j = r1 otherwise, and the
prospect f −1 by f
−
1j = f1j if f1j ≺1 r1 and by f −1j = r1 other-
wise. That is, f +1 is the positive part of f1 and f
−
1 is its
negative part. In a similar fashion, we define f +2 and f
−
2 .
Consider 1 on P1. Because  satisfies outcome mono-
tonicity and C1 is nondegenerate, all states of nature are
nonnull (a state is null if replacing any outcomes in that
state does not affect the preference). Also, because r1 lies
in the interior of C1, 1 is truly mixed (1 is truly mixed
if there exists a prospect f1 such that f
+
1  r1 and f +1 ≺ r1,
that is, genuine trade-offs between gains and losses occur).
By Theorem 12 in Köbberling and Wakker (2003) there
exists a prospect theory representation for 1 with U1, the
continuous utility function over C1, U1r1 = 0, and W+1 ,
and W−1 , the weighting functions over gains and losses on
the first attribute, respectively. Köbberling and Wakker’s
(2003) weak monotonicity follows from outcome mono-
tonicity and sign-comonotonic trade-off consistency follows
from trade-off consistency on C1. By Proposition 8.2 in
Wakker and Tversky (1993), gain-loss consistency can be
dropped from Köbberling and Wakker’s (2003) conditions
when the number of states of nature exceeds two. This is
the case in our analysis if we interpret attributes as events
(Sarin and Wakker 1998, Corollary B.3). U1 is strictly increas-
ing because V1 is strictly increasing. W
+
1 and W
−
1 are strictly
increasing by outcome monotonicity. By Observation 13 in
Köbberling and Wakker (2003), U1 is a ratio scale and W
+
1
and W−1 are unique. By solvability, U1 is unbounded.
By a similar line of argument, there exists a prospect
theory representation for 2, with U2 the continuous and
strictly increasing utility function on C2, U2r2 = 0, U2 a
ratio scale, and W+2 and W
−
2 the unique and strictly increas-
ing weighting functions over gains and losses on the second
attribute, respectively. By solvability, U2 is unbounded.
So far we have shown that V PT1f1PT2f2 repre-
sents . It remains to show that V is additive. We will
do so by showing that the rate of trade-offs between
PT1 and PT2 is everywhere constant. Take f1 ∈ P1 and
let f2 be a rank-ordered prospect in P2. Take 10 ∈ C2 such
that 10  f22. Then 
1
01f2 is a rank-ordered prospect
in P2. Let g2 be such that f2j  g2j for all j with at least
one of these preferences strict. By solvability there exists
an outcome 11 such that (f1 
1
01f2 ∼ f1 111g2. By
outcome monotonicity 11 2 10. Next we consider the
prospect (f1 111f2. By solvability we can find an out-
come 12 such that (f1 
1
11f2 ∼ f1 121g2 Hence,
12
1
1 ∼∗2 1110. We proceed in this manner to construct
a standard sequence 10
1
1    on the second attribute for
which 1s 
1
s−1 ∼∗2 1110 for all natural s. It is easily veri-
fied that this implies that PT21s 1f2− PT21s−11f2=
PT2111f2− PT2101f2. Suppose without loss of gen-
erality that PT2111f2−PT2101f2= 1.
Next we construct a standard sequence 10
1
1    on the
first attribute by eliciting indifferences 1t 1f1 
1
01f2∼
1t−11f1 
1
11f2, t = 12     such that all prospects
involved are rank-ordered. These indifferences imply that
1t 
1
t−1 ∼∗1 1110 for all natural t and, thus that PT11t 1f1−
PT11t−11f1= PT1111f1−PT1101f1. The indiffer-
ences also define a rate of trade-off between PT1 and PT2.
Let PT1111f1 − PT1101f1 = c. Then the rate of
trade-off between PT1 and PT2 is constant for all the
points we have elicited thus far. This claim follows from
trade-off consistency. By trade-off consistency, we must
have 111f1 
1
s−11f2 ∼ 101f1 1s 1f2 for any s =
12     Applying trade-off consistency again implies that
we must have 1t 1f1 
1
s−11f2 ∼ 1t−11f1 1s 1f2
for any s = 12   ; t = 12     Hence the rate of trade-off
between PT1 and PT2 is everywhere c.
Next we double the density of the grid 10
1
1    ×
10
1
1    that we constructed above. By continuity of U2
and connectedness of C2 we can find an outcome 
1/2
1 such
that PT2
1/2
1 1f2− PT2101f2= 1/2 Let 10 = 1/20 and
construct a new standard sequence 1/20 
1/2
1     by elicit-
ing indifferences (f1 
1/2
s−11f2∼ f1 1/2s 1g′2. It follows
from outcome monotonicity that 1/22 = 11 and, hence, in
general 1/22s = 1s , s = 01    
We construct a new standard sequence 1/20 
1/2
1     on
the first attribute by setting 1/20 = 10 and eliciting indif-
ferences 1/2t 1f1 
1/2
0 1f2 ∼ 1/2t−11f1 1/21 1f2, t =
12     We have to show that the rate of trade-off between
PT1 and PT2 in this new grid 
1/2
0 
1/2
1    ×1/20 1/21    
is still constant. For this we have to show that 1/22t = 1t ,
t = 01     We will show that 1/22 = 11. Then 1/22j = 1j  for
all j = 01    follows from the construction of the standard
sequence. By the construction of the standard sequence,
1/22 1f1 
1/2
0 1f2 ∼ 1/21 1f1 1/21 1f2. By trade-off
consistency 1/21 1f1 
1/2
1 1f2∼ 1/20 1f1 1/22 1f2=
101f1 
1
11f2 ∼ 111f1 101f2. By transitivity
and because 10 = 1/20 , 1/22 1f1 101f2 ∼ 111f1
101f2. By outcome monotonicity 
1/2
2 = 11 Hence, the
rate of trade-off between PT1 and PT2 is still constant when
we double the density of the grid.
We continue this doubling of density infinitely, creat-
ing increasingly fine standard sequences 2
−m
0 
2−m
1     and
2
−m
0 
2−m
1     m= 2     On the resulting increasingly fine
grids the rate of trade-off between PT1 and PT2 remains
constant by a similar proof as for the case where the density
of the grid was doubled.
Because U1 and U2 are unbounded, for any natural m
there can be no x1 ∈ C1 and no x2 ∈ C2 such that x1  2−mt
for all t or x2  2−ms for all s. There can also be no out-
comes infinitely close to 10 and 
1
0 in the sense that there is
always an outcome from the grid that lies between an out-
come x1 ∈C1 and 10, and an outcome from the grid that lies
between an outcome x2 ∈ C2 and 10 when x1 is unequal to
10 and x2 is unequal to 
1
0. If x2 = 10 then U2x2−U210=
c > 0 and, hence, there exists a natural number m such that
2−m < c. By construction, there is an element 2−m1 of the grid
such that 10 ≺ 2−m1 ≺ x2. A similar argument shows that the
grid interferes everywhere. Let x2 and y2 be two outcomes
such that x2  y2. Suppose that U2x2−U2y2= d > 0. Then
there exists a natural number m such that 2−m < d and by
construction there is an element 2−ms of the grid such that
y2 ≺ 2−ms ≺ x2.
Finally, because U1 and U2 are unbounded there can-
not be elements x1 and x2 that are so bad that they
are never included in any grid. Consider an outcome x2.
Then we can construct a prospect f2 with f2j = x2 for
all j . Because U2 is unbounded, we can construct a
prospect g2 such that f2j  g2j for all j . Let 10 = x2 and con-
struct a new grid by eliciting indifferences (f1 101f2 ∼
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f1 
1
11g2 f1 
1
11f2 ∼ f1 121g2) etc. This pro-
duces a dense grid that includes x2.
By continuity we can extend the dense grid to all out-
comes. Hence, we have shown that on the whole domain
the rate of trade-off between PT1 and PT2 is constant for
rank-ordered prospects. Hence, for rank-ordered prospects
V PT1f1PT2f2 is additive: V f  = PT1f1 + PT2f2
Because U1 and U2 are continuous and unbounded and C1
and C2 are connected, we can for any prospects f1 and f2
find rank-ordered prospects g1 and g2 such that f1 ∼1 g1
and f2 ∼2 g2. We set V PT1f1PT2f2= PT1g1+PT2g2
Finally, we show that PT1f1+ PT2f2 represents . Sup-
pose that f  g There are rank-ordered prospects f ′ and g′
such that f ′ ∼ f and g′ ∼ g By transitivity, f ′  g′ Hence,
PT1f1+ PT2f2 = PT1f ′1+ PT2f ′2 ≥ PT1g′1+ PT2g′2 =
PT1g1+PT2g2which completes the proof of statement (i).
The uniqueness results follow from the uniqueness
results for PT1 and PT2 combined with the fact that on each
grid the rate of trade-off between PT1 and PT2 must be con-
stant. This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
Proof of Theorem 3. That (i) implies (ii) is routine.
Hence, we assume (ii) and derive (i). The proof is very
similar to the proof of Theorem 1 and will not be elabo-
rated here. By weak separability V V1f1    Vmfm with
V strictly increasing in each of the Vi represents . We then
use the results of Köbberling and Wakker (2003) to show
that each Vi has a prospect theory representation. Finally,
we show, exactly as in the proof of Theorem 1, that for all
i k ∈ 1    m, the rate of trade-off between any PTi and
PTk is constant. This establishes the proof. 
References
Abdellaoui, M. 2000. Parameter-free elicitation of utilities and prob-
ability weighting functions. Management Sci. 46 1497–1512.
Abdellaoui, M., C. Barrios, P. P. Wakker. 2007. Reconciling
introspective utility with revealed preference: Experimen-
tal arguments based on prospect theory. J. Econometrics 138
356–378.
Abdellaoui, M., H. Bleichrodt, O. l’Haridon. 2008. A tractable
method to measure utility and loss aversion under prospect
theory. J. Risk Uncertainty 36 245–266.
Abdellaoui, M., H. Bleichrodt, C. Paraschiv. 2007. Measuring loss
aversion under prospect theory: A parameter-free approach.
Management Sci. 53 1659–1674.
Abdellaoui, M., F. Vossmann, M. Weber. 2005. Choice-based elic-
itation and decomposition of decision weights for gains and
losses under uncertainty. Management Sci. 51 1384–1399.
Bateman, I., A. Munro, B. Rhodes, C. Starmer, R. Sugden. 1997.
A test of the theory of reference-dependent preferences. Quart.
J. Econom. 62 479–505.
Birnbaum, M. H. 2008. New paradoxes of risky decision making.
Psych. Rev. 115 463–501.
Bleichrodt, H., J. Miyamoto. 2003. A characterization of quality-
adjusted life-years under cumulative prospect theory. Math.
Oper. Res. 28 181–193.
Bleichrodt, H., J. L. Pinto. 2000. A parameter-free elicitation of the
probability weighting function in medical decision analysis.
Management Sci. 46 1485–1496.
Bleichrodt, H., J. L. Pinto. 2002. Loss aversion and scale compati-
bility in two-attribute trade-offs. J. Math. Psych. 46 315–337.
Diecidue, E., U. Schmidt, H. Zank. 2009. Parametric weighting func-
tions. J. Econom. Theory. Forthcoming.
Dyckerhoff, R. 1994. Decomposition of multivariate utility functions
in non-additive utility theory. J. Multi-Criteria Decision Anal. 3
41–58.
Dyer, J. S., T. Edmunds, J. C. Butler, J. Jia. 1998. A multiattribute
utility analysis of alternatives for the disposition of surplus
weapons-grade plutonium. Oper. Res. 46 749–762.
Etchart-Vincent, N. 2004. Is probability weighting sensitive to the
magnitude of consequences? An experimental investigation on
losses. J. Risk Uncertainty 28 217–235.
Farquhar, P. H. 1975. A fractional hypercube decomposition theo-
rem for multiattribute utility functions. Oper. Res. 23 941–967.
Fischer, G. W., M. S. Kamlet, S. E. Fienberg, D. Schkade. 1986. Risk
preferences for gains and losses in multiple objective decision
making. Management Sci. 32 1065–1086.
Fishburn, P. C. 1965. Independence in utility theory with whole
product sets. Oper. Res. 18 28–45.
Fishburn, P. C. 1984. Multiattribute nonlinear utility theory. Man-
agement Sci. 30 1301–1310.
Fox, C. R., A. Tversky. 1998. A belief-based account of decision
under uncertainty. Management Sci. 44 879–895.
Kahneman, D., A. Tversky. 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of
decision under risk. Econometrica 47 263–291.
Keeney, R., H. Raiffa. 1976. Decisions with Multiple Objectives. Wiley,
New York.
Keller, R. L., D. N. Kleinmuntz. 1998. Is this the right time for a new
decision analysis journal? Decision Anal. Soc. Newsletter 17 3.
Kilka, M., M. Weber. 2001. What determines the shape of the prob-
ability weighting function under uncertainty? Management Sci.
47 1712–1726.
Köbberling, V., P. P. Wakker. 2003. Preference foundations for non-
expected utility: A generalized and simplified technique. Math.
Oper. Res. 28 395–423.
Köbberling, V., P. P. Wakker. 2005. An index of loss aversion.
J. Econom. Theory 122 119–131.
Marley, A. A. J., D. R. Luce. 2005. Independence properties vis-à-vis
several utility representations. Theory Decision 58 77–143.
Miyamoto, J. M. 1988. Generic utility theory: Measurement founda-
tions and applications in multiattribute utility theory. J. Math.
Psych. 32 357–404.
Miyamoto, J. M., P. P. Wakker. 1996. Multiattribute utility theory
without expected utility foundations. Oper. Res. 44 313–326.
Payne, J. W., D. J. Laughhunn, R. Crum. 1984. Multiattribute risky
choice behavior: The editing of complex prospects.Management
Sci. 30 1350–1361.
Prelec, D. 1998. The probability weighting function. Econometrica 66
497–527.
Rottenstreich, Y., C. K. Hsee. 2001. Money, kisses, and electric
shocks: On the affective psychology of risk. Psych. Sci. 12
185–190.
Sarin, R. K., P. P. Wakker. 1998. Dynamic choice and nonexpected
utility. J. Risk Uncertainty 17 87–119.
Schmidt, U. 2003. Reference dependence in cumulative prospect
theory. J. Math. Psych. 47 122–131.
Schunk, D., C. Betsch. 2006. Explaining heterogeneity in util-
ity functions by individual differences in decision modes.
J. Econom. Psych. 27 386–401.
Smith, J. E., R. L. Keeney. 2005. Your money or your life: A pre-
scriptive model for health, safety, and consumption decisions.
Management Sci. 51 1309–1325.
Smith, J. E., D. von Winterfeldt. 2004. Decision analysis in Manage-
ment Science. Management Sci. 50 561–574.
Tversky, A., C. Fox. 1995. Weighing risk and uncertainty. Psych. Rev.
102 269–283.
Bleichrodt, Schmidt, and Zank: Additive Utility in Prospect Theory
Management Science 55(5), pp. 863–873, © 2009 INFORMS 873
Tversky, A., D. Kahneman. 1991. Loss aversion in riskless choice:
A reference-dependent model. Quart. J. Econom. 56 1039–1061.
Tversky, A., D. Kahneman. 1992. Advances in prospect theory:
Cumulative representation of uncertainty. J. Risk Uncertainty 5
297–323.
Wakker, P. P. 1993. Unbounded utility for Savage’s “Foundation of
Statistics,” and other models. Math. Oper. Res. 18 446–485.
Wakker, P. P., D. Deneffe. 1996. Eliciting von Neumann-Morgenstern
utilities when probabilities are distorted or unknown. Manage-
ment Sci. 42 1131–1150.
Wakker, P. P., A. Tversky. 1993. An axiomatization of cumulative
prospect theory. J. Risk Uncertainty 7 147–176.
Wakker, P. P., H. Zank. 2002. A simple preference-foundation of
cumulative prospect theory with power utility. Eur. Econom.
Rev. 46 1253–1271.
Wu, G., R. Gonzalez. 1999. Nonlinear decision weights in choice
under uncertainty. Management Sci. 45 74–85.
Zank, H. 2001. Cumulative prospect theory for parametric and mul-
tiattribute utilities. Math. Oper. Res. 26 67–81.
